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STORIES ABOUT PROPERTY 
William W. Fisher Ill* 
PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, 
AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP. By Carol M. Rose. Boulder: 
Westview Press. 1994. Pp. ix, 317. $24.50. 
For a decade, Carol Rose1 has been writing provocative essays 
about the history, doctrine, and theory of private property. Irrever-
ent, unpredictable, learned, and concise, these articles have been a 
pleasure to read. The same traits make them wonderful teaching 
tools. It is thus not surprising that several excerpts from Rose's es-
says have found their way into first-year Property casebooks.2 
Many Property teachers, myself included, go further, assigning en-
tire articles.3 Each year, some of the most energetic classroom dis-
cussions spring from those assignments. 
Property and Persuasion contains eight of those articles plus a 
previously unpublished essay, Seeing Property (pp. 267-304). For 
two reasons, the book is better than a set of copies of the original 
essays. First, although Rose has sensibly left unchanged the argu-
ments of the individual articles, she has updated many of the foot-
notes and pared others. The resulting essays are both more current 
and more trim. Second, she has included many substantive cross-
references, suggesting how the theses of the articles relate to one 
another. These links make it possible to see how the various parts 
of Rose's complex conception of property hang together - or, as 
will be suggested below, in some instances do not hang together. 
Among the characteristics that make the essays so refreshing is 
their unusual narrative form. These are not typical law review arti-
cles, marching predictably through premises, analyses, and doctrinal 
applications. They are quirky and surprising. Sometimes, like 
Faulkner novels, they go over the same ground two or three times, 
examining a doctrine or problem from various points of view. For 
example, in The Comedy of the Commons (p. 105), perhaps the best 
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. B.A. 1976, Amherst College; J.D. 1984, Ph.D. 
1991, Harvard University. - Ed. 
1. Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law and Organization, Yale Law School. 
2. See, e.g., JESSE DuKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 19-20, 37-38 (3d ed. 1993). 
3. My personal favorite for these purposes is Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. 
L REv. 577 (1988), which I assign when I am discussing conveyancing. Professor Joan Wil-
liams reports that students in her Property classes regularly find that Women and Property: 
Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REv. 421 (1992), is the most eye-opening of all the 
readings in her course. 
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essay in the book, she studies the development of American and 
English "public property" doctrines from many angles, and each 
perspective is sufficiently different that the reader does not lose 
patience. 
Sometimes the essays change course suddenly. For example, the 
bulk of Possession as the Origin of Property (p. 11) consists of an 
effort to identify the economic logic underlying the "first-occu-
pancy" principle - the notion that the first person to reduce an 
unowned object or animal to "firm possession" owns it. But two 
pages from the end, the tone changes abruptly from panglossian to 
critical. The :first-occupancy principle may have served effectively 
to maximize the material welfare of the Europeans who conquered 
the Western Hemisphere, Rose insists, but its central presupposi-
tion (that human beings are outsiders to nature) made no sense to 
- and indeed helped justify the forcible ouster of - the Native 
American population.4 The shift is jarring, and that, presumably, 
was her intent. 
Finally, like Dorothy, Rose frequently strays from the road of 
her own argument. These detours, instead of distracting, contain 
many of the most memorable parts of the book. For example, the 
primary topic of the final essay, Seeing Property (p. 267), is whether 
it is good or bad that ownership is so closely related to vision -
that property as a socioeconomic institution depends heavily on vis-
ual markers and codes (fences, maps, photographs, and so on) and 
that property law employs many visual metaphors ("body politic," 
"bird on a wagon,"5 and so on). Rose's main, typically revisionist 
claim is that the sense of sight - in general and in connection with 
property - is epistemologically more constructive than its critics 
contend; that it is just as "interactive" and social as the senses of 
hearing or smell; that it sensitizes us to the ephemeral character of 
?ll rights as much as to their solidity; and that it is fully compatible 
with the telling of stories and thus is not vulnerable to the charge 
that it "eradicates ... the dimension of time, and with time, the 
importance of experience and even consciousness" (p. 270). But in 
the midst of this abstrlj.se - and not wholly convincing - argu-
ment, Rose pauses to explore a more mundane - and illuminating 
- topic. Although visual metaphors are not inherently misleading, 
she argues, some of the metaphors we have developed to describe 
property rights are. Specifically, the comparison of a fee simple to a 
"bundle of sticks," although useful for some purposes, unfortu-
4. See pp. 18-20. Note that it is this concluding point - not the positive economic argu-
ment that precedes it- that finds its way into the most popular first-year property casebook. 
See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 2, at 19-20. 
5. 5 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 'II 670[2], at 60-6 {Patrick J. 
· Rohan ed., 1996) (asserting that a real covenant is annexed to an estate "like a bird riding on 
a wagon"). 
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nately inclines us to think of all of the entitlements that make up a 
property right as easily separable and "all more or less alike" 
(p. 280). This tendency, she plausibly contends, impedes our ability 
to deal sensibly with particular doctrinal problems - such as (she 
might have suggested) the issue of when a governmental regulation 
of land use goes so far as to constitute a "taking."6 A metaphor 
more sensitive to the heterogeneity and interdependence of the 
rights constitutive of ownership, she playfully but shrewdly pro-
poses, would be "[t]oys in a toy chest" (p. 280). Similarly suggestive 
tangents abound in the other essays.7 
In view of Rose's evident familiarity with contemporary narra-
tive theory, it is hard to believe that these stylistic innovations are 
inadvertent. An important substantive aspiration of her book, she 
frequently tells us, is to destabilize conventional understandings of 
ownership. The novel organization of the argument is equally effec-
tive in challenging conventional expectations concerning the proper 
form of legal scholarship. In view of her equally apparent familiar-
ity with contemporary feminist theory,8 it is also hard not to associ-
ate the stylistic innovations with Rose's gender. In many other 
fields - literary theory and anthropology come to mind most 
quickly - feminist theorists during the past decade have insisted 
upon the interdependence of misogynist substantive views and pa-
triarchal narrative forms.9 Dislodging one requires dislodging the 
other. Although Rose never expressly aligns herself with such 
projects, she at least is proceeding along a parallel course. 
The novelty of the form of the book should not be exaggerated, 
however. One never has any doubt when reading through these 
essays that they were produced by a single author. Rose's voice 
appears to have changed little over the decade in which they were 
written. More importantly, the same concerns recur in most of the 
essays. Three themes are particularly prominent and merit re-
sponse: an effort to refine the conventional utilitarian theory of 
property and the associated progressive history of property doc-
6. Compare, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (empha· 
sizing the magnitude of the economic impact of the regulation on the owner of the land, 
rather than the character of the entitlement abridged) with Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat· 
tan CA1V Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (going to the opposite extreme by holding that any 
impairment of a landowner's right to exclude others, no matter how trivial, constitutes a 
taking). 
7. For example, the central topic of the second essay is how narratives concerning the 
origin of private property rights have enabled many theorists to conceal a gap in their argu-
ments - namely, that the same collective-action problems that make private property rights 
socially necessary would also impede the establishment of a private property regime. See pp. 
37-38. Toward the end of the essay, however, Rose takes up a different issue: the possibility 
that these narratives might have some hortatory value in cultivating altruism. See pp. 41-42. 
8. See chapter 8. 
9. See, e.g., MARILYN STRATIIERN, THE GENDER OF TIIE Gwr. PROBLEMS W1Tii WOMEN 
AND PROBLEMS W1Tii SOCIETY IN MELANESIA (1988). 
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trine; the excavation and defense of a competing, republican theory 
of property; and a reassessment of the venerable question of the 
relationship between rules and standards. 
l. CLASSICISM AND !Ts DISCONTENTS 
Central to many of Rose's essays is an argument she describes 
as the "classical theory of property." A blend of utilitarian political 
theory, neoclassical economics, and materialist history, this ap-
proach contends that property rights originate in the efforts of the 
members of a society to maximize their aggregate welfare. The as-
signment of scarce resources to individual owners, so the argument 
goes, has four related beneficial effects. First, it provides the per-
sons to whom the rights are assigned incentives to engage in socially 
beneficial activities. Second, it avoids "tragedies of the commons" 
- the tendency of persons who have access to unowned or com-
munally owned resources to overuse them. Third, it reduces "rent 
dissipation" - the tendency of people to spend their time grabbing 
resources in the hands of others. Fourth, it facilitates commerce -
mutually beneficial exchanges of resources and services. 
Social recognition of these advantages, the argument continues, 
typically occurs in three stages. In stage one, there is more than 
enough of a resource to satisfy all members of the society. Conse-
quently everyone is permitted to appropriate as much as she wishes 
and no effort is made to manage the resource. Stage two represents 
an intermediate or transitional phase. As the free-for-all of the ini-
tial period threatens to exhaust the resource, "a group or tribe may 
jointly take over the resource - such as a hunting area or a set of 
common fields - and reserve access to its own members, perhaps 
allocating in-group access according to a set of informal customary 
arrangements" (p. 164). Increasing scarcity eventually renders this 
arrangement inadequate, whereupon the members of the society 
typically shift in stage three to a full-blown property regime, in 
which discrete pieces of the resource are assigned to individual 
owners. This :final phase is not static, however; legal rules are con-
stantly adjusted to provide the individual owners socially optimal 
incentives to use and conserve the resources that have been en-
trusted to them. 
Rose's posture toward the classical theory is complex. Some-
times she relies, seemingly uncritically, on ·the standard story to 
make sense of some aspect of property law. In the first essay, for 
instance, she observes that several doctrines in Anglo-American 
law place a premium on "clear acts of possession" - manifesta-
tions of dominion sufficiently obvious to be noticed by members of 
the pertinent community. The most important of these doctrines 
doctrine is the :first-occupancy principle, mentioned above, which 
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assigns ownership of certain objects to the persons who first visibly 
take hold of them. Another is adverse possession, under which a 
trespasser can acquire title to land only if his long-continued wrong-
ful occupancy is, among other things, sufficiently "notorious." The 
best explanation of such rules, Rose contends, is that, by quickly 
and reliably assigning resources to determinate people, they mini-
mize rent-seeking (p. 16). To be sure, they sometimes result in the 
allocation of resources to persons not in the best position to put 
them to productive use, but as long as the entitlements are clear-
cut, such misallocations can be easily corrected through voluntary 
bargains. This explanation, which emphasizes the economic advan-
tages of consensus concerning who owns what, also helps explain 
the willingness of courts, when deciding cases on the edges of these 
doctrines, to defer to customary understandings within particular 
communities regarding what counts as possession. The overall ef-
fect of the argument is to reinforce the economists' contention that, 
when resources are scarce, private property rights - and the par-
ticular rules adopted by courts to administer the private-property 
regime - operate to maximize the aggregate welfare of the mem-
bers of a society. 
This sort of uncritical acceptance and amplification of the classi-
cal theory is, however, unusual in the book. More often, Rose 
seeks to modify or refine the standard story in some way. A fine 
illustration is her highly original essay on the history of water law 
(pp. 163-96). In both England and the United States, Rose points 
out, sharp-edged property rights in water did not emerge in the way 
or at the time the classical theory would seem to predict. Indeed, 
doctrinal development in this field seems sometimes to have moved 
backward, as when the English courts abandoned relatively clear-
cut, stage-three-style doctrines (such as the rules in force before the 
middle of the eighteenth century, favoring "ancient" uses, or the 
regime advocated by Blackstone and others in the late eighteenth 
century, favoring the first person to put water to productive use) 
and replaced them with more vague, stage-two-style doctrines (such 
as the muddy "reasonable-use" rule). What, according to Rose, ex-
plains these and other deviations from the expected pattern? The 
answer is not, as one might expect, that the classical story is wrong. 
Rather, she argues, each regime was indeed optimal during the pe-
riod in which it emerged, but for reasons not noticed by the devel-
opers of the classical theory. For example, the first-occupancy rule 
- employed in England in the late eighteenth century and in Mas-
sachusetts for much of the early nineteenth century - was well 
suited to the kinds of disputes that dominated those jurisdictions at 
those times, in which the plaintiffs typically complained that the de-
fendants, by constructing dams downstream, had thrown water back 
upon the plaintiffs' water wheels. In such situations, it was most 
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important that the disputants know their rights; if, by chance, the 
first appropriator was not the most efficient user of the water, the 
other party could and should buy him out. By contrast, when the 
paradigmatic disputes involved defendants who either diverted 
water from a stream or cast debris into it, thereby injuring many 
riparian owners downstream, lawmakers, sensing that collective-ac-
tion problems would prevent Coasean bargains, adopted the rea-
sonable-use rule, which, in view of the public-goods characteristics 
of moderately scarce water used primarily for power instead of con-
sumption, approximated the efficient solution. The principal lesson 
of the analysis is that each of the legal regimes adopted over the 
centuries to handle conflicts over water actually made good eco-
nomic sense. 
A more far-reaching and overtly iconoclastic argument of the 
same general form dominates The Comedy of the Commons (pp. 
105-62). The essay begins with a demonstration that English and 
American law contains three mechanisms by which the "public" -
either the sovereign or, more interestingly, an unorganized nongov-
ernmental "public" - can assert or acquire property rights: the 
"public trust" doctrine, in which the community as a whole is 
deemed to have inalienable rights to certain resources; the related 
doctrines of prescription and implied dedication, which grant the 
public permanent easements in lands over which they have long 
regularly traveled; and the doctrine of customary rights, which con-
verts ancient customary practices (such as conducting an annual fes-
tival on particular lands) into permanent property rights. She then 
carefully traces the history of the application of these doctrines to a 
variety of important resources: roads, navigable streams, tidal 
lands, town greens, and so on. The classical theory, she argues con-
vincingly, cannot account for the persistence or expansion of these 
doctrines. Classical theorists' only justification for public property 
is that negative externalities resulting from uncontrolled private ex-
ploitation of resources sometimes can be efficiently controlled only 
through government ownership and management, and that argu-
ment fails to make sense of many of the historical examples she 
catalogues. But this powerful critique does not prompt Rose, as 
one might expect, to repudiate the wealth-maximization hypothesis. 
On the contrary, she offers a clever explanation of why these doc-
trines and practices, upon reflection, operated and continue to op-
erate to make everyone better off. Certain resources, she argues, 
are most valuable when used by an indefinite and unlimited number 
of persons. When those resources are also physically susceptible of 
monopolization by private persons - i.e., when "holdout 
problems" are likely to prevent voluntary transfers of those re-
sources from individuals to the collectivity - then semi-compul-
sory uncompensated acquisitions of the resources in question by the 
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public make good economic sense. Lo and behold, the three 
Anglo-American public-property doctrines, as refined by the courts 
during the nineteenth and twentieth century, take hold in precisely 
- and only - those circumstances. 
The cumulative effect of arguments of this sort is a picture of 
property law similar to those supplied by Richard Posner10 and 
Robert Ellickson,11 but more supple and nuanced. Like Posner and 
Ellickson, Rose seems (most of the time) to believe that legal rules 
ought to be shaped to maximize aggregate consumer welfare and 
that Anglo-American property law in fact has done a remarkably 
good job of achieving that end - but she is less wedded than either 
author to the notion that, except in unusual circumstances, a crisp 
system of individual private rights best manages scarce resources. 
This flexibility enables her to be even more sanguine than her com-
rades in arms - even more adept at providing plausible economic 
rationales for the oddities of our current legal system. 
In the end, however, Rose's explanations, ingenious as they may 
be, are not fully convincing. Three related difficulties afflict each of 
her arguments in this vein. First, even her nuanced narratives can-
not account for all of the case law in the fields she considers. In 
water law, for example, many courts defied her guidelines for effi-
cient adjustment of riparian rights. Confronted with disputes in-
volving the diversion or pollution of streams, they sometimes opted 
not for the reasonable-use rule - Rose's preferred solution - but 
for either prescriptive easements12 or the natural-flow rule.13 For 
backflow cases, Rose advocates the prior-appropriation doctrine, 
but the courts did not always agree.14 In general, antebellum water 
law was substantially more chaotic than Rose would have us be-
lieve.15 Her account of the development of public property rights is 
similarly flawed. Although her analysis goes far toward explaining 
and justifying the expansion during much of American history of 
the public-trust and public-prescriptive-easement doctrines, it fails 
to makes sense of the fact that the doctrine of customary rights was 
sharply curtailed by American courts beginning at least as early as 
the antebellum period.16 
10. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 3.1 (3d ed. 1986). 
11. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE LJ. 1315 (1993). 
12. See, e.g., Bullen v. Runnels, 2 N.H. 255, 257 (1820). 
13. See, e.g., Sackrider v. Beers, 10 Johns. 241 (N.Y. 1913). 
14. See, e.g., Gilman v. Tiiton, 5 N.H. 231, 232-33 (1830). 
15. See William Fisher, The Law of the Land: An Intellectual History of American Prop-
erty Doctrine, 1776-1880, at 239-54 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard). 
16. Rose acknowledges American courts' hostility to the doctrine. Pp. 122-28. However, 
she does not attempt to reconcile that fact with her analysis of the economic merits of the 
doctrine. Pp. 124-27. 
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Second, the judges and legislators who shaped these doctrines 
described their objectives in terms that do not align closely with 
Rose's analysis. To be sure, they included among their goals things 
that Rose would find congenial - facilitating commerce, fostering 
the productive use of resources, etc. - but they also thought they 
were advancing other ends as well, such as protecting the rights of 
individual landowners against potentially tyrannical majorities and 
rendering decisions that fairly reflected the equities of individual 
controversies.17 It would be surprising if these aspirations did not 
often prompt them to deviate from the criterion of economic 
efficiency. . 
Finally, Rose fails to identify the mechanism by which the law 
came to embody economic wisdom. Other historians and econo-
mists, convinced that there is an economic logic to legal history, 
have suggested several possible mechanisms. Each of their theo-
ries, however, suffers from serious difficulties. Rose's account, in-
stead of addressing those problems, exacerbates them. 
The simplest and most commonly held view is exemplified by 
Richard Posner's work. The reasons that the common law has 
evolved in the direction of economic efficiency, Posner contends, 
are: (1) most economic principles are "commonsensical";18 (2) 
common sense in the United States in the nineteenth century, when 
the common law acquired much of its modem shape, was especially 
favorable to economic principles;19 (3) most judges have been 
shrewd enough to realize that the legislature is better equipped 
than the judiciary to (re )distribute wealth, and that, accordingly, 
they should devote their energies to shaping rules that increase the 
size of the pie to be distributed;20 and ( 4) judges' aspirations to 
render "fair" decisions did not conflict with that commitment, be-
cause most conceptions of fairness are, at bottom, disguised intu-
itions concerning economic efficiency.21 An obvious objection to 
this argument is that lawmakers often say they are trying to achieve 
things - such as the protection of "rights" for their own sake -
that have long been thought to conflict with the pursuit of economic 
17. See, e.g., Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312). 
18. See PosNER, supra note 10, § 8.1, at 232. 
19. See id. § 8.1-.4. The "educated classes" accorded considerable importance to eco-
nomic growth, and many were steeped "in a laissez-faire ideology based on classical econom-
ics." Id. § 2.2, at 21. 
20. See id. § 8.1, at 232. For recent defenses of the view that Posner attributes to judges, 
see A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAw AND ECONOMICS 110-13 (1983); 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax 
in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994). 
21. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972) ("Be-
cause we do not like to see resources squandered, a judgment of negligence has inescapable 
overtones of moral disapproval, for it implies that there was a cheaper alternative to the 
accident"). 
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efficiency.22 A less obvious objection, developed by Gillian Had-
field, is that judges do not encounter a random sample of disputes, 
and thus, even if they were exclusively concerned with the max-
imization of wealth, the biases in the information they receive 
would prevent them from achieving their goal.23 Rose now supplies 
us with another reason to doubt the Posnerian mechanism: the 
legal rule that would result in the most efficient exploitation and 
management of a scarce resource, she persuasively argues, is often 
not at all "commonsensical" (p. 232). Indeed, most of the political 
theorists and economists who have hitherto discussed the rules per-
taining to riparian rights, navigable waterways, roads, town greens, 
and so on have failed to discern the optimal solutions. It seems 
highly unlikely that busy judges, proceeding on the basis of intui-
tion, could have done better. 
An alternative mechanism might be derived from the recent 
work of Robert Ellickson. The informal, customary norms that 
arise in close-knit communities, Ellickson argues, often work re-
markably effectively to maximize the welfare of the members of 
those communities. So, for example, the norms that evolved among 
nineteenth-century whalers and twentieth-century ranchers did a 
remarkably good job of minimizing the costs - "deadweight 
losses" and "transaction costs" - associated with conflicts over 
whales and the injuries caused by trespassing cattle.24 By observing 
that judges, when shaping the common law, often defer to well-es-
tablished, welfare-enhancing customs, one might - although El-
lickson himself does not - seek to explain why common law 
doctrines of the sort charted by Rose seemed to evolve so nicely in 
the direction of allocative efficiency. This explanatory edifice 
would have several weaknesses, however, only two of which need 
be mentioned here.25 First, Ellickson carefully and sensibly limits 
his argument to the informal norms developed by close-knit social 
groups, and many of the rules that concern Rose did not arise in 
such communal settings. Second, Ellickson also notes that his argu-
ment can explain at most the evolution of "workaday" norms 
(norms that regulate people's everyday affairs), not "foundational" 
norms such as the fundamental principles that protect persons and 
22. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
23. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEo. L.J. 583 (1992). 
24. See ROBERT c. ELUCKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 184-206 (1991); Robert c. Ellick-
son, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. 
ECON. & ORO. 83 (1989). 
25. For others, see Robert Merges, Among the Tribes of Shasta County, 18 LAW & Soc. 
INoumY 299 (1993). 
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property;26 the latter, of course, are precisely the kinds of norms 
with which Rose is concerned. 
The third possible mechanism might be described as the natural-
selection theory of common law development. Even if judges have 
no economic aptitude or aspirations, some economists have argued, 
the common law will gradually evolve in the direction of efficiency 
because disputants are more likely to litigate (and to request refor-
mation of the extant rules) when those rules are inefficient than 
when they are already efficient.27 The many difficulties associated 
with this argument need not detain us, because even the more en-
thusiastic proponents of the theory acknowledge that, for the evolu-
tionary mechanism to work, at least three conditions must obtain: 
(1) both the plaintiffs and the defendants in a substantial propor-
tion of the controversies that arise under a rule are "repeat players" 
with sufficient long-term stakes in the content of the rule to justify 
the expense of litigation; (2) transaction costs prevent the affected 
parties from "bargaining around" an inefficient rule; and (3) judges 
are not pursuing any objectives other than economic efficiency with 
enough vigor to swamp the mild pressure exerted by the differential 
pattern of litigation. In most of the fields of property law discussed 
by Rose, at least one of these conditions does not hold. In many of 
the areas (e.g., public prescriptive easements, adverse possession), 
affected parties tend not to be repeat players. In other contexts 
(e.g., controversies between adjacent riparian owners), transaction 
costs are low. Finally and most importantly, for the reasons 
sketched above, judges administering these fields have frequently 
sought explicitly to advance or respect noneconomic values. 
In sum, the revisionist arguments deployed by Rose seeking to 
make economic sense of property laws that seem inconsistent with 
the classical story are clever and in some cases plausible, but she 
has not solved - and indeed may have amplified - important dif-
ficulties associated with the positive economic interpretation of the 
common law. 
II. RIVAL THEORIES OF PROPERTY 
The classical theory, although certainly the most popular and 
probably the most powerful of the perspectives on property, is not, 
Rose insists, the only game in town. She devotes two of the essays 
26. See ELLICKSON, supra note 24, at 283-84. For a criticism of this distinction, see Lewis 
A. Kornhauser, Are There Cracks in the Foundations of Spontaneous Order?, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 647, 653 (1992) (book review). 
27. A relatively simple argument of this general form is contained in Paul H. Rubin, Why 
ls the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). More complex and qualified 
versions are deployed in PAUL RUBIN, BUSINESS FIRMS AND THE COMMON LAW (1983); 
Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of 
Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980). 
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in her book to the elaboration and partial defense of a dramatically 
different view: what she refers to as the theory of the "ancient 
constitution." 
To understand the character and importance of Rose's argu-
ment, one needs some historiographic background. Beginning in 
the 1960s, two lines of innovative scholarship laid the foundation 
for a dramatic reassessment of the character of the American 
Revolution and indeed of the whole of American political history. 
First, philosophers, anthropologists, and historians of science began 
paying much greater attention to the ways in which ideological fil-
ters influence how people perceive and construct their social and 
physical environments.28 Second, a group of British historians ar-
gued convincingly that the "Country" party in mid-eighteenth-cen-
tury England derived many of its ideas from the venerable 
ideological tradition of classical republicanism.29 Republicanism, as 
these scholars explicated it, revolved around the following proposi-
tions: active, altruistic involvement in public affairs is essential to a 
good life; to be an effective and responsible citizen, a man must be 
economically and psychologically "independent," which in tum re-
quires that he own at least a modest amount of property and not 
have to rely on the monarch, or anyone else, for his livelihood; and 
a healthy polity . embodying these ideals is delicate and easily in-
fected by the diseases of "luxury," "corruption," and standing ar-
mies.30 Observing that the same ideas figured prominently in the 
political discourse of the British North American colonies, a group 
of historians led by Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and J.G.A. 
Pocock invoked the new understanding of the mind-shaping power 
of ideology to mount a successful assault on the then-dominant in-
terpretation of the origins of the Revolution.31 To explain the 
break with England, they insisted, we must look not to the logic of 
Lockean liberalism or to the material interests of the Patriots,32 but 
to how the ideology of republicanism caused the colonists to per-
ceive the relatively innocuous initiatives of the British imperial au-
thorities as fundamental threats to their liberties. 
28. See, e.g., PETER BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE {1966); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES {1973); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE SmUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS {1962). 
29. See, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT {1975); CAROLINE ROB· 
BINS, THE EIGHTEENTH·CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN (1959). 
30. See PococK, supra note 29, at 361-422. 
31. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (1967); POCOCK, supra note 29, at 462-552; GORDON s. WOOD, THE CREATION 
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-17frl {1969). 
32. For expressions of these interpretations, see CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS {2d ed. 1942); ARTHUR 
MEIER SCHLESINGER, NEW VIEWPOINTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY {1922). 
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This new reading of the Revolution was both powerful and sug-
gestive. Alerted to the content and importance of classical republi-
canism, other historians began to see signs of its persistence into 
later periods. Jeffersonianism, the Jacksonian and Whig persua-
sions, the aspirations of antebellum working-class movements, and 
late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century protest move-
ments were all reread as avatars of the classical vision.33 The net 
result was a conception of the overall shape of American political 
history radically different from the one that had prevailed during 
the previous generation. Where Louis Hartz and Daniel Boorstin 
had seen a stable liberal consensus established with the first settle-
ments and continuing to the present, the revisionist historians saw a 
grand narrative of ideological struggle and transformation. A re-
publican orthodoxy, they contended, had powered the Revolution 
and helped determine the original shape of the nation, but some-
time between the drafting of the Federal Constitution and the end 
of the nineteenth century (exactly when was a matter of much con-
troversy) it had been largely, though not completely, displaced by a 
liberal ideology. This ideology was less interested in civic virtue 
and political participation; more receptive, to individualism, com-
merce, and capitalism; and more protective of private rights. Re-
publicanism had not disappeared altogether, but it had become a 
suppressed, subordinate ideology.34 
In the 1980s, an important group of law professors sought to 
extract from this :q.ew vision of American history lessons for their 
own fields. Some of these scholars argued that republicanism pro-
vides us conceptions of the good life and the good society superior 
to those supplied by liberalism and should prompt us to reconstruct 
several fields of contemporary doctrine. For example, cities and 
other fora for the exercise of citizenship should be accorded greater 
autonomy and power; businesses should be discouraged from mov-
ing their bases of operation when the result would be to disrupt 
local communities; group libel laws and limits on campaign contri-
butions should not be deemed to violate the First Amendment; and 
courts should encourage legislatures to engage in empathetic 
33. See, e.g., LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A 
PARTY IDEOLOGY (1978); DREW R. McCoY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY 
IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA (1980); HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLI-
TICS OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1990); SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORI< 
CITY & THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788-1850 (1984); THOMAS BROWN, 
POLITICS AND STATESMANSHIP: ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY {1985); Lary May, 
Movie Star Politics: The Screen Actors' Guild, Cultural Conversion, and the Hollywood Red 
Scare, in RECASTING AMERICA: CULTURE AND PoLmcs IN THE AGE OF COLD WAR 125 
(Lary May ed., 1989). 
34. For a fine sketch of the emergence of this view - and, in particular, of the contro-
versy concerning the timing of the suppression of republicanism - see Daniel T. Rodgers, 
Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11, 19-20 {1992). 
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processes of rational deliberation.3s Other scholars were less 
programmatic and invoked republicanism for heuristic purposes -
as a generator of arguments we might consider, rather than as a 
blueprint for reform.36 
In the past decade, the republican reconceptualization of Amer-
ican history and law has lost much, though not all, of its momen-
tum. A growing group of historians has contended that it is 
misleading to describe our ideological history in terms of a struggle 
between two discrete worldviews - that Americans' political 
thought has been more creative and eclectic than such a narrative 
would suggest.37 At the same time, political and legal theorists 
have become more sensitive to the unattractive features of the 
classical republican vision - its association with slavery, its pugna-
cious cast, its sexism, and its apparent incompatibility with cultural 
pluralism.38 Proposals that we reformulate contemporary doctrines 
to track the republican outlook have, accordingly, become less 
common. 
One of the causalities of these historiographic struggles was the 
clarity and coherence of our understanding of the outlook of the 
Antifederalists, the eclectic group who opposed the ratification of 
the Federal Constitution. Before 1965, when the Constitution was 
seen by most historians as the natural outgrowth of the same Lock-
ean impulse that produced the Revolution itself,39 the Antifederal-
ists were generally seen as paranoid and short-sighted - "men of 
little faith," as Cecilia Kenyon called them.4o By contrast, in 
Gordon Wood's great revisionist study of the founding of the na-
tion, the Antifederalists were depicted as valiant, even heroic, 
champions of the dying ideology of classical republicanism, resisting 
the liberal innovations of the Federalists.41 As the Bailyn-Wood-
35. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 
105 HARV. L REv. 1511, 1515-16, 1528-41 {1992); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Femi-
nine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 543-57 {1986); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Note, A 
Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 HARV. L. REv. 682 {1988). 
36. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional 
Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L REV. 291, 292-94, 314-15 
{1989); William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1335, 1338-50 
{1991). 
37. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal 
Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L Rev. 273 {1991); Hendrik Hartog, Imposing Constitutional Traditions, 
29 WM. & MARYL. REv. 75, 77-78 (1987); James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: 
Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 14 J. AM. HIST. 
9 (1987); Rodgers, supra note 34, at 34-38. 
38. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE LJ. 1713 {1988). 
39. For the major exception, see CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES {1913). 
40. See Cecelia M. Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Repre-
sentative Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3d ser., 3 (1955). 
41. See Wooo, supra note 31, chs. 10, 12. 
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Pocock reconceptualization has come under increasing attack, this 
image has blurred - to the point where, in Wood's most recent 
book on the Revolution, the Federalists have become the custodi-
ans of the republican outlook, while the Antifederalists appear as 
hardheaded, acquisitive, individualistic liberals.42 
The third and fourth essays in Rose's book provide a novel per-
spective on these debates - not a dramatic reformulation, but a 
helpful set of adjustments. She begins with the shrewd observation 
that classical republicanism was just one variant of a general out-
look toward politics, society, and property widely held by Western 
Europeans prior to the late eighteenth century (pp. 73-78). Com-
monly associated with the phrases, "ancient constitution" and "pro-
priety," this outlook placed much stock in "long-standing ways of 
doing things, justified either by the sheer antiquity of practice or by 
the wisdom and suitableness that antiquity signifies" (p. 73). Hos-
tile to the centralization of political power and to the equalization 
of individuals' fortunes and "privileges," this outlook championed 
"local particularism" - preservation of the powers and perquisites 
of the many social and political organizations that lay outside the 
control of the increasingly powerful European monarchs. 
The American Antifederalists, Rose argues, were the carriers of 
this political tradition (pp. 85-92). Whereas the Federalists advo-
cated the centralization of political power, the promotion of com-
merce, and secure private property rights of the sort that would 
facilitate commerce, the Antifederalists clung to an older set of val-
ues: localism, the importance of civic virtue, and "proper" property 
rights - i.e., holdings appropriate to each person's station and civic 
responsibility. In two senses, she contends, the Antifederalists 
"lost" (p. 85). First, the Constitution not only was ratified but be-
came a sacred document, a central feature of Americans' self-con-
ception. Second and less obviously, the outlook of Antifederalism 
has not figured significantly in our theories of either government or 
property. She argues, however, that the Antifederalist vision has 
had a little-noticed but powerful impact on American culture: it 
has found expression in and helped to sustain. a strong tradition of 
political localism. Even today, we can "see a number of the Anti-
federalist attitudes and concerns in our local politics: the accept-
ance of community definitions of the rights and responsibilities of 
property, the concern for virtue and corruption, the possibility for 
personal participation or voice, the further possibility for choice 
through the 'exit' option" (p. 89). We would do well, Rose con-
tends, to pay greater attention to the merits of these aspects of our 
political practice and to ensure that they endure. 
42. See GORDON s. Wooo, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 258 
{1991). 
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In three respects, this modestly revisionist narrative is valuable. 
First, it helps bring back into focus our picture of the worldviews 
and legacies of Federalism and Antifederalism. All historical anal-
ogies have their limitations, but Rose's characterization of the Fed-
eralists as "monarchists" and the Antifederalists as defenders of the 
"ancient constitution" rings more true than any of the recent efforts 
to align the two groups with the categories of liberalism and repub-
licanism. Rose's detailed account of the persistence of a tradition 
of localism also seems less pretentious and more illuminating than 
other historians' efforts to document the enduring power of the de-
tailed ideology of civic humanism. 
Second, by attempting less than the champions of republican-
ism, Rose's effort to harness history for normative purposes accom-
plishes more. Reminding us of the merits of localism is less grand, 
but more constructive, than invocations of James Harrington and 
the Commonwealthmen in reformations of contemporary constitu-
tional or administrative law. To be sure, Rose sometimes stretches 
her points - as when she suggests that Americans have paid 
greater attention to questions of "virtue" and corruption when en-
gaged in local politics than when participating in national elections 
(p. 87), or when she assures us that the ability of citizens to "exit" 
from their localities has operated historically as an effective check 
on oppressive or racist practices by municipalities (p. 90). These 
enthusiasms aside, however, Rose's retelling of the story represents 
a substantial advance. 
Third, Rose has succeeded in her central ambition: to hold up a 
developed conception of property and its relationship to social and 
political life that can stand as a viable alternative to the classical 
utilitarian vision. She is correct that conceiving of "property as pro-
priety" provides us a vantage point and basis for reform dramati-
cally different from the orthodox perspective. 
This third accomplishment comes at a cost, however. In her 
haste to deploy and accredit the Antifederalist vision, Rose brushes 
aside or ignores two other substantial theories of property that 
could have assisted her in her larger project of highlighting the con-
tingency of the classical view. The first of these is the labor-desert 
theory. Originally developed by Locke and updated and modified 
by a variety of modern political and legal theorists, the labor theory 
centers on the notion that, by laboring upon an object or resource 
held "in common," a person acquires a natural property right in the 
thing with which he has mixed his labor - a property right that the 
state has a duty to respect and protect.43 At two points, Rose turns 
43. See JoHN LocKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF Gov. 
ERNMENT ch. 5 (Peter Laslett ed., rev. ed. 1960) {1690); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 
(1985); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); Wendy J. Gordon, A Prop· 
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her attention to the Lockean theory; both times, she puts it down. 
In'her book's opening essay, Possession as the Origin of Property 
(pp. 11-28), she briefly considers the labor theory as a possible ex-
planation and justification for the common law rule awarding own-
ership to the first person to reduce a resource to "firm 
possession."44 Two difficulties, she contends, prevent it from serv-
ing effectively in that capacity. First, it fails to explain why a la-
borer should be deemed to own his own labor and thus is incapable 
of explaining why labor upon an unowned object creates a property 
right rather than merely dissipating the laborer's energy (p. 11). 
Second, the theory contains no guidelines for determining "the 
scope of the right that one establishes by mixing the owned thing 
(one's labor) with something else" (p. 11). The other occasion 
arises in the course of a brusque review of Stephen Munzer's book, 
A Theory of Property. 45 Munzer argues that three principles shape 
American property law: "(a) preference satisfaction (that is, a com-
bined version of efficiency and utility), (b) justice and equality, and_ 
( c) desert" (by which Munzer means primarily providing appropri-
ate rewards to labor) (p. 51). What Munzer fails to recognize, Rose 
contends, is that principles (b) and ( c) are, in truth, nothing more 
than derivatives of principle (a) (pp. 55-58). In particular, the prop-
osition that a laborer deserves a reward "is an obvious corollary to 
a property regime that tries to increase the bag of goodies by en-
couraging the investment of effort and time" (p. 57). The labor-
desert argument, in other words, fails to provide a normative crite-
rion that is not ultimately reducible to wealth-maximization. 
Two circumstances should make us hesitate before accepting 
Rose's dismissal of the labor-desert theory. First, countless judges 
and legislators have relied - and continue to rely - on it when 
shaping property rights.46 Rose's excavation of the outlook of An-
tifederalism is inspired partly by the notion that a challenge to the 
classical theory of property is most likely to be effective if it can 
draw on elements of our own political and legal tradition; the same 
notion should make her pause before discarding a nonutilitarian 
theory of property rights that has already played a substantial role 
in the shaping of our law. Second, when polled concerning the ideal 
criterion of distributive justice, the large majority of Americans 
(and Western Europeans) offer some variant of what social psychol-
ogists call the "equity theory" - the gist of which is that each per-
erty Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual 
Property, 102 y ALE L.J. 1533 (1993). 
44. The explanation she prefers is sketched supra on pp. 1779-80. 
45. STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990). 
46. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562-63 
(1984); International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236, 239-40 (1918); In re 
Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 76-77 (Colo. 1978). 
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son deserves a share of the fruits of a collective enterprise 
proportionate to his or her contribution to the venture.47 That out-
look is sufficiently close to the Lockean vision that, again it would 
behoove Rose to pause before tossing Locke aside. 
To be sure, the difficulties toward which Rose points are sub-
stantial - too substantial to be definitively resolved here - but 
Rose is wrong to suggest that they are obviously insurmountable. 
The justification for the notion that a person owns his own labor 
might be derived from a variety of sources: what Locke calls "natu-
ral reason";4s Rawls' technique of "reflective equilibrium";49 or 
perhaps, indirectly, through rumination concerning the immorality 
of slavery, the system in which a person's right to her own labor is 
most explicitly denied. The famous proportionality problem - the 
difficulty of determining the scope of the property right produced 
by labor upon an unowned object50 - might be addressed through 
an elaboration of the Lockean "sufficiency" proviso: the notion 
that one cannot through labor acquire a natural property right un-
less "enough, and as good [is] left in common for others."51 Finally, 
the proposition that one can finds strains of utilitarianism in 
Locke's theory is correct (and familiar),52 but Rose improperly in-
fers from that fact that the labor-desert argument has no independ-
ent normative power. Rose goes astray partly by assuming too 
quickly that one deserves a reward only for a certain type of labor: 
"labor that produces goods or services that people want" (p. 57). 
Property theorists working this vein have proposed a variety of 
other criteria for identifying work of the sort that can underlie natu-
ral property rights: the sheer expenditure of time and effort;53 en-
gaging in activities that one would prefer not to do and others 
would prefer not to do;54 and "creative" or "transformative" la-
47. For a discussion of equity theory, see MORTON DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 9-10 (1985). For a summary of the empirical work 
showing the popularity of the theory among contemporary Americans and Western Europe· 
ans, see J. Stacy Adams & Sara Freedman, Equity Theory Revisited: Comments and Anno-
tated Bibliography, in 9 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 43, 47-49 
(Leonard Berkowitz & Elaine Waister eds., 1976). 
48. See LOCKE, supra note 43, at 303. 
49. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20, 48-51 (1971). 
SO. For the classic illustration of this difficulty, see NozrcK, supra note 43, at 257-60. 
51. LocKE, supra note 43, at 306. For some work in this general vein, see Gordon, supra 
note 43. 
52. See, e.g., ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY 14-48 (1984). 
53. Locke himself seems to have had such a criterion in mind, or at least he seems unin-
terested in whether the laborer's activity produced things that other people (as opposed to 
the laborer himself) valued. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 
GEO. LJ. 'lZT, 305 (1988). 
54. See id. at 302. 
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bor.ss Adoption of one of these alternative interpretations would 
make the argument far less vulnerable to assimilation by the utilita-
rian juggernaut. To repeat: the point is not that the difficulties in 
the Lockean vision identified by Rose are easily remedied, but 
rather that they are not necessarily insoluble and that there are 
good reasons - reasons with which Rose herself should agree -
for continuing to work on them. 
The other potentially powerful theoretical rival of the classical 
theory of property is the personality or "personhood" theory of 
property. Its core is the notion that persons need stable control 
over certain objects and a certain amount of resources in order fully 
to be able to realize their selves, and the law ought to ascertain and 
respect, in the form of property rights, persons' claims to those re-
sources. Less well grounded in Anglo-American political theory 
and legal practice than the labor-desert theory, this argument nev-
ertheless has a respectable theoretical lineage (originating, as it 
does, in the writings of Kant and Hegel), many manifestations in 
modem property doctrine, and some formidable contemporary ex-
ponents.s6 Yet it does not figure at all in Rose's book. Again, if her 
ultimate goal is to destabilize - by revealing the contingency of -
the classical, utilitarian vision, she would do well not to neglect such 
potentially powerful allies. 
III. FORMS OF NORMS 
In the le~con of contemporary American legal theory, "rules" 
are crisp legal norms that direct a decisionmaker's attention to a 
few pertinent aspects of a dispute and thereby enable her to resolve 
the controversy in a determin~te, predictable manner.57 "Stan-
dards" are more open-ended !egal norms that instruct a deci-
sionmaker to consider many aspects of a dispute and compel her to 
exercise discretion in determining the relative weight of those as-
pects and thus how the controversy should be resolved.58 
55. Cf. Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving To Own Intellectual Property, 68 Cm.-KENT L. 
REv. 609 (1993) (emphasizing the distinction between ordinary labor and creative, original 
labor). ' 
56. The best analyses of the origins and implications of the theory are MARGARET JANE 
RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993) and JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRI-
VATE PROPERTY (1988). 
57. An example would be a rule prescribing that, if a person dies intestate survived by a 
spouse and two children, his or her spouse shall receive one-half of the decedent's real and 
personal property, and the children each shall receive one-quarter. For a more complex but 
similarly crystalline rule, see MAss. GEN. L. ch. 190, §§ 1-3 (1994). 
58. An example would be a norm directing a judge, when apportioning marital property 
to spouses who are obtaining a divorce, to consider: 
"the duration of the marriage • . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount and 
sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each 
of the parties ... the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preser-
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A substantial body of literature explores the relative merits of 
these two forms.59 Rules, it is often said, have two principal advan-
tages. First, by providing private parties reliable guidance concern-
ing their rights and duties, rules facilitate planning and trade and 
discourage rent seeking, thereby enhancing productivity and eco-
nomic efficiency. Second, by diminishing the discretion exercised 
by judges and the corresponding dangers of bias and corruption, 
rules increase the chances that like cases will be decided alike and 
that elected representatives will determine the principles by which 
we are governed. Rules, in other words, facilitate democracy and 
fidelity to the "rule of law." Standards, by contrast, are said to have 
three advantages. First, they contribute to economic efficiency by 
encouraging foolish and ignorant parties (who, in a society domi-
nated by hard-edged rules, are likely to fear exploitation by the 
shrewd and informed) to get involved in economic activity - to 
invest in companies, buy houses, and so on. Second, by avoiding 
the inevitable over- and under-inclusiveness of rules, standards 
make possible more precise implementation of substantive policy 
goals. Third, standards foster a deliberative or conversational ap-
proach to dispute resolution in which judges make their decisions 
only after consulting among themselves and with the disputants 
concerning the most just outcome - a method that fosters both 
contextually sensitive rulings and normatively attractive modes of 
governance. 
In Crystals and Mud in Property Law (pp. 199-202), Rose re-
flects on how this debate illuminates - and is illuminated by - the 
content and history of property doctrine. As is true of most of her 
essays, Rose approaches the topic from several disparate angles. 
The most predictable of the perspectives is normative: Rose seeks 
to add to the evaluative literature summarized in the preceding par-
agraph (p. 202). Her contributions in this vein are only modest. 
She nicely summarizes but does not materially refine the debate 
concerning the relationship between the forms of norms and eco-
nomic efficiency, and she devotes little attention to the 
noneconomic dimensions on which rules and standards differ. Even 
vation, depreciation, or appreciation in value of the respective estates, and the contribu-
tion of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit." 
UNIF. MARRIAGE & D1voRCE Acr § 307(a), 9A U.L.A. 238-39 (1987) (alternative A of 
§ 307). 
59. The principal pertinent works are: MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES 15-63 (1987); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECJSION·MAKING IN LAw AND IN LIFE (1991); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term - Foreword: The Court and the Economic 
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of 
Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 
(1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term - Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L REv. 22 (1992). 
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in 1988, when the essay was first published, one could find more 
rich treatments of the subject elsewhere, and today one would cer-
tainly not look to Crystals and Mud for an answer to the question 
whether rules or standards are better. 
More intriguing is Rose's discussion of the didactic messages 
conveyed by the two types of norms. Building on the seminal arti-
cle by Duncan Kennedy, Rose observes that rules and standards 
express radically different conceptions of ourselves and the ways in 
which we wish to associate with each other. Rules connote or cele-
brate individualism, separateness, liberalism, predictability, and se-
curity. Standards connote or celebrate community, connectedness, 
altruism, flexibility, and vulnerability. It is far from clear, Rose ar-
gues convincingly, that the two types of norms in fact advance the 
ideals with which they are conventionally associated. Thus, rules, 
by facilitating commerce, may foster "sociability" and community 
more than standards, and it is no accident that philanthropy flour-
ished during historical periods dominated by rules and the related 
ideology of classical liberalism. By contrast, as the drafters of the 
UCC recognized, within a community whose members share cus-
toms and a vocabulary, standards - like "commercial reasonable-
ness" - may result in more predictable decisionmaking than 
crystalline rules. However, the fact that the two types of norms do 
not necessarily serve the values with which they are commonly as-
sociated only enhances their rhetorical importance. Our endless 
debate over rules and standards reflects and helps sustain a 
profound and unresolved tension in our aspirations: Do we "view 
friends, family, and fellow citizens from the same cool distance as 
those we do not know at all," or do we "treat even those to whom 
we have no real connection with the kind of engagement that we 
normally reserve for friends and partners?" (p. 225). In presenting 
the topic this way, Rose draws upon and amplifies one of the cen-
tral arguments of the original incarnation of Critical Legal 
Studies.60 
The most original and provocative of the views Rose takes of 
the rule/standards debate concerns its historical dimension. Few 
fields in property law, she argues, have been dominated for long by 
one form or the other. The more typical pattern is an "oscillation": 
sharp-edged rules gradually corrode, giving way to vague standards, 
which in tum are replaced by a new regime of rules that corrode, 
and so forth. For example, in the mid-twentieth century, the harsh 
but crisp doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to sales of houses was 
overrun by the muddy warranty of habitability, which imposed sub-
stantial but vague duties on both the builders and the sellers of 
60. See, e.g., KELMAN, supra note 59, at 3; Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Black-
stone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L. REv. 205, 211-12 (1979). 
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homes. Private parties briefly were able to reinstitute a crystalline 
regime through contractual waivers of this new warranty, but the 
courts, by refusing to enforce such warranties, opted for standards 
(pp. 202-03). Similar trends can be seen in the laws governing 
mortgages, the recording of land titles, and rights to continued 
flows of sunlight (pp. 201, 203-08). What accounts for these oscilla-
tions? Rose speculates that "endogenous" forces may be at work. 
In other words, each form triggers behavior that precipitates a 
swing to the other form. Rules, precisely because of their clarity, 
tend to get "overused" (like a field held in common), thereby di-
minishing their reliability and prompting us to tum to standards. 
Rules also commonly result in visible and galling "forfeitures" -
losses or penalties disproportionate to the lapses that occasioned 
them - the unfairness and inefficiency of which also inclines us to 
tum to standards. Eventually, however, the unpredictability and 
expense of standards makes us yearn for a return to rules. 
The observation that our reliance upon rules and standards to 
manage our affairs has changed over time seems entirely right, but 
the particular story Rose tells is misleading in two related respects. 
First, during the twentieth century, most fields of property law -
and most other fields of American law as well - have witnessed 
not an oscillation between rules and standards, but a long slide into 
the pit of standards. The erosion of the hard-edged Rule Against 
Perpetuities by "reform" statutes of one sort or another;61 the repu-
diation of the principle of caveat lessee in landlord-tenant law in 
favor of the muddy implied warranty of habitability;62 the allocation 
to judges of ever greater discretion for dividing spouses' property 
upon divorce;63 the proliferation of vague exceptions to landown-
ers' rights to exclude unwanted entrants;64 the abandonment of the 
sharp-edged tripartite classification of tort plaintiffs injured on pri-
vate land - invitees, licensees, and trespassers - in favor of a ge-
neric negligence doctrine;65 the growing importance of the 
doctrines of promissory estoppel and quasi-contract;66 the deterio-
ration of the principle that a seller of goods has no affirmative duty 
to disclose information to the buyer;67 the erosion of discretion-re-
ducing guidelines in the law of child custody in favor of the generic 
61. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAw OF PROPERTY 143-48 (1993). 
62. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 
B.C. L. REV. 503 (1982). 
63. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE Acr § 307(a), 9A U.L.A. 238-39 (1987) (alter-
native A of § 307). 
64. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971). 
65. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). 
66. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRAcr 55-85 (1974). 
67. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS§§ 4.9-.15 (2d ed. 1990). 
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standard of the "best interests of the child";6s and the growing pop-
ularity of discretionary "balancing tests" in constitutional law69 all 
reflect shifts in the direction of standards. There are exceptions to 
be sure, such as the repudiation of the negligence principle ( quali-
fied by the fellow-servant rule) in favor of worker's compensation 
systems for dealing with industrial accidents or the revival of crimi-
nal sentencing guidelines. But they are just that: exceptions. Even 
the fields on which Rose concentrates seem, on reflection, inconsis-
tent with her "oscillation" thesis. For example, during the twentieth 
century the law governing sales of homes has steadily become in-
creasingly muddy; the brief retreat in the direction of rules that 
Rose emphasizes did not result from any adjustment in the gov-
erning doctrine but from the efforts of private parties to employ 
contractual waivers to override that doctrine - efforts the courts 
soon rejected. 
Recognition of this trend exposes the other weakness in Rose's 
account: her reliance on "endogenous" factors to explain the rela-
tionship over time of rules and standards. To make sense of the 
overwhelming recent trend in the direction of "mud," one needs to 
consider forces larger than those to which Rose directs our atten-
tion. What those forces might be is far from clear. The consolida-
tion and ascendancy, through Progressivism and then the New 
Deal, of an ideology - associated primarily but not exclusively 
with the Democratic Party - more receptive to altruism and 
"safety nets" than individualism and self-reliance? The logic of cul-
tural hegemony, in which "soft" legal rules are used to disguise such 
things as the steadily widening gap between the rich and the poor in 
the United States?70 The success (or abandonment) of the effort -
described by P.S. Atiyah in his related study of the development of 
contract law in England - by late-nineteenth-century lawmakers 
to use crystalline legal forms to instill in the populace the habits of 
forceful productive activity necessary to a free market?71 The 
"needs" or institutional concomitants of post-industrial welfare cap-
italism? Much work and thought would be required to assess these 
hypotheses. The only thing that seems certain is that Rose's ac-
count is inadequate. 
68. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEAR'Ili 234-85 (1985); Fran Olsen, The 
Politics of Family Law, 2 LAw & lNEQ. J. 1 (1984). 
69. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE 
LI. 943 (1987). But cf. Sullivan, supra note 59, at 60-62 (disagreeing with the conventional 
view on this score). 
70. Cf. Jay M. Fineman & Peter Gabel, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE Pouncs OF 
LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRrnouE 373, 381-85 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990). 
71. See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CoNTRACT (1979). Rose 
takes note of this hypothesis on p. 213. 
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CONCLUSION 
Property and Persuasion deserves careful attention. Wide-rang-
ing, well informed, highly original, playful yet serious, it will pro-
voke many intense reactions. Under critical pressure, not all of 
Rose's arguments hold up, but many do. More importantly, the 
book should stimulate a series of conversations that will deepen our 
understanding of property and law. 
